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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
PAULA JEAN WRIGHT, and the 
State of Utah, by and through 
Utah State Department of 
Social Services, 
Plaintiff-Appellant, ] 
vs. ] 
JOHNNY FRANK WRIGHT, 
Defendant-Appellee. 
\ Case No. 960367-CA 
JURISDICTION OF THE COURT OF APPEALS 
The above-entitled court has jurisdiction of this appeal 
because it is an appeal from the district court involving domestic 
relations, specifically child custody, Utah Code Ann., Section 78-
2a-3(2)(h) (Supp. 1996). 
ISSUES FOR REVIEW 
The issues for review herein are as follows: 
1. Did the District Court abuse its discretion in 
imposing the sanction of striking Plaintiff Wright's (hereinafter 
"Plaintiff") pleadings and entering a Default Judgment against 
Plaintiff? 
2. Did the District Court abuse its discretion by 
denying Plaintiff's Motion for Relief from Order and Judgment? 
The standard for review for a discretionary decision by 
a trial court is that it should be reversed if the ruling is so 
unreasonable as to be arbitrary and capricious or a clear abuse of 
discretion. Ames v. Maas, 846 P.2d 468, 476 (Utah Ct. App. 1993). 
Both issues herein were preserved by Plaintiff's Motion 
for Relief from Order and Judgment filed with the Court on or about 
May 2, 1996. 
TEXT OF AUTHORITIES 
1. Utah R. Civ. P. 37 is set forth in full in the 
addendum. 
2. Utah R. Civ. P. 60(b) is set forth in full in the 
addendum. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
A. Nature of the Case. 
The instant matter was brought before the lower court by 
a Petition to Modify Decree of Divorce filed by Defendant, which 
was responded to by Plaintiff. Plaintiff also filed a Counter-
Petition to Modify Decree of Divorce. The Petition to Modify 
sought to change the custody of the parties' minor child from 
Plaintiff to Defendant. The Counter Petition sought to increase 
child support. 
B. Course of Proceedings. 
Defendant filed and served the Petition to Modify Decree 
of Divorce in or about August 1995. Plaintiff, by and through her 
counsel of record, filed an answer to the Petition and Counter-
Petition on or about September 15, 1995. On or about October 19, 
1995, Defendant served Defendant's First Set of Discovery Requests 
to Plaintiff, which constituted various interrogatories and 
requests for production of documents. R. 181-85; 188-90; 197-98. 
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Before answering the requests for discovery, Plaintiff's 
counsel withdrew on or about January 24, 1996. On March 29, 1996, 
Defendant filed a Motion to Strike "Answer to Petition to Modify 
Decree of Divorce", "Counter-Petition", and for Judgment 
(hereinafter "Motion for Sanctions"). Plaintiff did not respond to 
the Motion and on April 23, 1996 the District Court entered an 
Order Striking "Answer to Petition to Modify Decree of Divorce", 
and Striking "Counter-Petition" and Granting Judgment in Favor of 
Defendant, which, inter alia, ordered a change of custody from 
Plaintiff to Defendant and dismissed Plaintiff's claims for 
increased child support. R. 200; 213-15; 232-35. 
On or about May 2, 1996, after obtaining new counsel, 
Plaintiff filed a Motion for Relief from Order and Judgment and 
Motion for Stay and Request for Expedited Hearing and Decision. 
The parties presented oral argument in the matter on May 15, 1996. 
R. 270-71; 304. 
D. Disposition of the Court. 
The lower court denied the motion of Plaintiff and on 
June 7, 1996 entered an Ord^r formally denying the Motion for 
Relief from Order and Judgment. R. 317-18. See Course of 
Proceedings, above. 
D. Statement of Facts, 
In or about August, 1995, Defendant filed and served a 
Petition to Modify Decree of Divorce requesting, inter alia, a 
change of custody from Plaintiff to Defendant. Plaintiff 
immediately obtained counsel, Michael W. Park, and filed an Answer 
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to the Petition and a Counter Petition to increase child support on 
or about September 15, 1995. R. 181-85; 188-90. 
On or about October 19, 1995, Defendant mailed and served 
Defendant's First Set of Discovery Requests to Plaintiff, which 
Plaintiff's attorney immediately mailed to Plaintiff. Likewise, on 
or about October 31, 1995, Plaintiff's counsel served Plaintiff's 
First Set of Interrogatories and Production of Documents upon 
Defendant and a copy of those was mailed to Plaintiff as well. 
After receiving copies of both the Defendant's and Plaintiff's 
discovery requests, Plaintiff did not hear anything further from 
her attorney and, based upon information Plaintiff had obtained 
from others, that Defendant was having difficulty in his current 
marriage, believed that the matter had been dropped. Without 
hearing further from her counsel, in late January, 1996, Plaintiff 
received a Notice of Withdrawal of Counsel from Mr. Park and 
shortly thereafter received a Notice to Appoint Counsel or 
Represent Self from counsel for Defendant. Nothing further 
occurred until early April 1996 when Plaintiff received Defendant's 
Motion for Sanctions. R. 197-98; 199; 278-279. 
Immediately upon receipt of the aforesaid Motion for 
Sanctions, Plaintiff contacted Mr. Park to determine whether he 
would agree to reenter an appearance in her behalf. When Plaintiff 
was finally able to speak with Mr. Park, he advised her that, in 
order for him to reenter the case, he would require a retainer, 
which Plaintiff was unable to pay- Mr. Park also suggested that 
Plaintiff contact Utah Legal Services, who had earlier represented 
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Plaintiff in her divorce. Plaintiff contacted Utah Legal Services 
in Salt Lake City where she then resided, but was later advised to 
contact the Cedar City office. Plaintiff was finally able to 
contact the Cedar City office of Utah Legal Services in mid-April. 
On or about April 24, 1996, Plaintiff received a letter dated April 
18, 1996 from Utah Legal Services advising her that although she 
was financially eligible for its services, it would not be able to 
handle her case. Immediately thereafter, Plaintiff contacted her 
present counsel, Floyd W Holm, who agreed to handle the case. R. 
279-80. 
By the time Mr. Holm was able to receive Plaintiff's file 
and review the matter, the lower court had already granted the 
Motion for Sanctions and entered judgment against Plaintiff 
changing custody. Plaintiff did file a timely Motion for Relief 
from Judgment on the ground of excusable neglect, which was denied 
by the lower court. R. 270-71; 280; 317-18. 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
POINT I: 
Plaintiff's failure to respond to discovery, although 
technically improper, did not sufficiently frustrate the ends of 
justice to justify the lower court's striking her pleadings and 
entering default judgment against her. Such action by the lower 
court constituted a clear abuse of discretion by the lower court, 
POINT II; 
Based upon Plaintiff's belief that the case had been 
dropped, her difficulty in obtaining new counsel when the Motion of 
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Defendant was filed, and the lack of any affirmative or deliberate 
attempts at frustrating prosecution of the case, the lower court 
should have set aside the default judgment and allowed the matter 
to proceed on its merits. To not allow the action to proceed on 
its merits, which is favored in the law, constituted an abuse of 
discretion. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
THE TRIAL COURT'S ENTRY OF DEFAULT JUDGMENT AS 
A SANCTION FOR FAILURE TO PROVIDE DISCOVERY 
WAS AN ABUSE OF DISCRETION 
Rule 37(b) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure provides 
that if a party fails to timely respond to discovery requests such 
as those made by Defendant here/ he can move the court for 
sanctions pursuant to Rule 37(b)(2), including the sanction of 
striking of pleadings and entering a default judgment against the 
disobedient party. Utah R. Civ. P. 37(b)(2)(C) & (d). 
Furthermore, it is not necessary that the aggrieved party first 
file a motion to compel discovery under Rule 37(a). W.W. & W.B. 
Gardner, Inc. v. Park West Village, Inc., 568 P.2d 734, 737 (Utah 
1977). 
The Utah Supreme Court affirmed the ultimate sanction of 
default judgment under the circumstances of Gardner. Id. at 738. 
The court, however, stated as follows: 
The extreme sanction of default or 
dismissal must be tempered by the careful 
exercise of judicial discretion to assure that 
its imposition is merited.... The sanction of 
default judgment is justified where there has 
been a frustration of the judicial process, 
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viz., where the failure to respond to 
discovery impedes trial on the merits and 
makes it impossible to ascertain whether the 
allegations of the answer have any factual 
merit. 
Id. (footnotes omitted)(citing Vac-Air, Inc. v. John Mohr & Sons, 
Inc., 471 F.2d 231, 234 (7th Cir. 1973); Bollard v. Volkswagen of 
America, Inc., 56 F.R.D. 569, 582-585 (W.D. Mo. 1971)). 
In Gardner, defendant was served with interrogatories in 
October of 1975 and again in July and August of 1976. Not until 
having been seirved a Motion for Default Judgment did defendant 
respond to the request on September 15, 1976, some ten and one-half 
months after the first set of interrogatories was propounded. In 
addition, defendant had failed to answer requests for admissions or 
to even request that they be withdrawn after the time for answering 
them had passed. There is no evidence that the Defendant was not 
represented by competent counsel during all stages of the 
proceedings. X6L. at 736. 
In Darrington v. Wade, 812 P.2d 452, 456 (Utah Ct. App. 
1991), this court agreed that default judgment as a sanction for 
discovery failures is a harsh remedy that "should be meted out with 
caution", and despite grievous acts of delay and avoidance, upheld 
the lower court's determination to set aside its earlier sanction 
of default judgment for failure to comply with discovery. In 
Darrington, despite repeated orders compelling discovery, an 
earlier default judgment which was set aside, failure to appear at 
scheduled depositions and other uncooperative acts by the 
defendants, this court held that the lower court's setting aside 
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the default for a second time was not an abuse of discretion. in 
regard to the tactics of the Defendant, this court stated as 
follows: 
It has now been almost eight years since 
Troy Darrington's injury first occurred in 
this fairly straightforward personal injury 
case. Despite the Plaintiff's dogged, albeit 
sometimes overzealous, pursuit of a judgment, 
Wades employed what appeared to be dilatory 
tactics at every turn. We find such 
litigation strategies most obnoxious. 
For all the defendants knew, the case may 
have been susceptible to a quick and easy 
resolution in their favor. Regardless of how 
the merits of the case may eventually be 
resolved, however, if the defendants had 
shouldered their obligation to face up to the 
claims against them, and resolve the issue as 
to their liability, the case could have been 
concluded much sooner, thereby avoiding a 
great deal of wasted time and expense. If 
litigants in every case acted 'as these have, 
the justice system would quickly come to a 
standstill. 
Id. at 456 n. 2. 
In the instant case, unlike Gardner, the Plaintiff was 
not represented by counsel at the time the Motion for Sanctions was 
made by Defendant. Further, unlike Gardner, only slightly over 
five months had passed since the request for discovery was first 
propounded on Plaintiff. In the meantime, at least to Plaintiff, 
there was no meaningful activity in the case. Indeed, Defendant 
had not responded to the discovery propounded upon him less than 
two weeks after the request for discovery from Plaintiff. In this 
case, their is not evidence of any dilatory tactics on the part of 
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Plaintiff to avoid answering discovery or delay the proceedings.1 
Furthermore, as more thoroughly discussed below, there is no 
evidence of any meaningful frustration of the judicial process by 
Plaintiff. It is thus a clear abuse of discretion for the lower 
court to impose the sanction of default judgment and dismissal of 
the counter petition when this court in Darrington held that the 
lower court did not abuse its discretion in setting aside such a 
sanction despite all of the allusive, uncooperative, dilatory and 
obstructive tactics of the defendants there. 
POINT II 
THE TRIAL COURT ABUSED ITS DISCRETION BY 
FAILING TO SET ASIDE THE DEFAULT JUDGMENT 
Rule 60(b) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure provides 
that a party is entitled to relief from a judgment or order of the 
court on the grounds of mistake or excusable neglect and it is "in 
the furtherance of justice.11 Utah R. Civ. P. 60(b). Generally, 
the appellate courts of this state have held that default judgments 
are disfavored and should be entered only rarely when circumstances 
permit so that, "in the furtherance of justice", cases can be heard 
on their merits. Interstate Excavating, Inc. v. Agla Development 
Corp, 611 P.2d 369, 371 (Utah 1980); Heathman v. Fabian and 
Clendenin, 14 Utah 2d 60, 377 P.2d 189, 190 (1962); Mayhew v. 
Standard Gilsonite Co,, 14 Utah 2d 52, 376 P.2d 951 (1962); Locke 
•'•As will be discussed below, Plaintiff did not believe the 
proceedings were being actively prosecuted until she received 
Defendants Motion for Sanctions. 
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v. Peterson, 3 Utah 2d 415, 285 P.2d 1111 (1955); Darrington v. 
Wade, 812 P.2d 452, 456 (Utah Ct. App. 1991). 
The facts of Interstate Excavating are similar to those 
at bar. There, the lower court entered a default judgment as a 
result of the defendant's failure to appear at trial. The 
defendant had originally been served with a summons and complaint 
and its counsel filed an answer in response thereto. At a pretrial 
conference, counsel for defendant was allowed to withdraw and 
counsel for plaintiff was instructed to advise defendant of the 
same so that it could obtain new counsel and appear at the trial 
scheduled some three weeks later. When defendant or its 
representative did not appear at the trial, the court entered a 
default judgment against it. Upon learning of the default judgment 
approximately one week later, defendant, through new counsel, 
immediately filed a motion to set aside the default judgment• 
Defendant claimed that he had never received notice of the trial, 
that some confusion may have been caused by the fact that its 
former counsel had withdrawn from several cases simultaneously, and 
the notice to appoint successor or appear in person and trial may 
have been misplaced with numerous other papers. Interstate 
Excavating, 611 P. 2d at 370. Based upon the above-stated 
circumstances, the Utah Supreme Court held that it was an abuse of 
discretion for the lower court to deny the motion to set aside 
default judgment and stated as follows: 
It is not to be questioned that in 
appropriate circumstances default judgments 
are justified; and when they are, they are 
invulnerable to attack. However, they are not 
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favored in the law, especially where a party 
has timely responded with challenging 
pleadings. When that has been done some 
caution should be observed to see that the 
party is not taken advantage of. Speaking 
generally about such problems, it is to be 
kept in mind that access to the court for the 
protection of rights in the settlement of 
disputes is one of the most important factors 
in the maintenance of a peaceable and well-
ordered society. This of course must be done 
in obedience to the rules; and it is to be 
conceded that there is a possibility that the 
defendant was less than diligent in attending 
to its interest in this lawsuit. But no 
evidence was taken, nor did the court make any 
findings other than the order denying 
defendant's motion. 
The uniformly acknowledged policy of the 
law is to accord litigants the opportunity for 
a hearing on the merits, where that can be 
done without serious injustice to the other 
party. To that end the courts are generally 
indulgent toward the setting aside of default 
judgments where there is a reasonable 
justification or excuse for the defendant's 
failure to appear, and where timely 
application is made to set it aside• 
Id. at 371 (footnotes omitted). 
In the instant case, as in Interstate, Plaintiff's 
counsel had withdrawn at the time the Motion for Sanctions was 
filed. Plaintiff has given a reasonable and justifiable excuse as 
to why she neglected to answer the discovery: That she believed 
the case to have been dropped. Also, as in Interstate, through her 
counsel she had filed challenging pleadings. As in Interstate, it 
seems that Defendant was taking advantage of Plaintiff's lack of 
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counsel and thereby preventing Plaintiff from having a very 
important issue of child custody determined on its merits.2 
As in Interstate, the court did not take any evidence nor 
did it make any findings other than to simply deny Plaintiff's 
motion.3 Finally, as in Interstate, to set aside the default 
judgment would not have done any serious injustice to Defendant. 
Now that Plaintiff had new counsel, the judge could have ordered 
that she respond to the discovery within a time certain. Certainly 
ten days would have been acceptable. Then if Plaintiff failed to 
respond, default judgment may be more appropriate. No trial date 
had been set in the case. Indeed, Defendant had not even responded 
to Plaintiff's requests for discovery. It is difficult to see any 
injustice that could have resulted to Defendant to by setting aside 
the default, let alone serious injustice.4 
2The priority classification of this case should be some 
indication of the importance of the issues involved. Utah R. App. 
P. 29(b). 
3Defendant may argue that default judgment was appropriate 
because Plaintiff had wrongfully withheld visitation of the minor 
child from Defendant. However, the court had only the bald 
allegations of Defendant's affidavit to substantiate this fact, and 
Plaintiff was not allowed to present evidence to controvert the 
affidavit. Of course, the matter of withheld visitation was one of 
the key issues to be determined on the merits. 
4Again, Defendant' may argue that Defendant suffered serious 
injustice because he had been denied visitation of his child; 
however, Defendant was not without a remedy. He could have 
immediately filed order to show cause proceedings or a motion for 
temporary order regarding custody, and such matters could have been 
heard on the merits immediately. In fact, contemporaneous with his 
Motion for Sanctions, Defendant requested and received an Order to 
Show Cause on the issue of visitation. R. 221-27. Defendant could 
have served and prosecuted the Order to Show Cause at any time. 
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CONCLUSION 
Based upon the above discussion, this court should 
reverse the order of the lower court entering default judgment and 
dismissing the Counter Petition and/or the order denying the motion 
to set aside default judgment. The matter should then be remanded 
to the district court for disposition of the issues presented by 
the Petition to Modify and Counter Petition on their merits. 
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this „ / ^ day of November, 1996. 
^ ^ ^ 
FLOYD yW HOLM 
Attcwney for Plaintiff-Appellant 
MAILING CERTIFICATE 
I hereby certify that I mailed a two (2) true and correct 
copies of the above arid foregoing BRIEF OF APPELLANT to Willard R. 
Bishop, P.O. Box 279, 6330, Cedar City, UT 84720, this ^^day of 
November, 1996, first class postage fully prepaid. 
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Rule 37. F a i l u r e to m a k e or c o o p e r a t e in d i s cove ry ; 
s a n c t i o n s . 
(a) Mot ion for o r d e r compel l ing d i scovery . A party, 
upon reasonable notice to other parties and all persons af-
fected thereby, may apply for an order compelling discovery as 
follows: 
(1) A p p r o p r i a t e cour t . An application for an order to 
a party may be made to the court in which the action is 
pending, or, on matters relating to a deposition, to the 
court in the district where the deposition is being taken. 
An application for an order to a deponent who is not a 
party shall be made to the court in the district where the 
deposition is being taken. 
(2) Mot ion . If a deponent fails to answer a question 
propounded or submitted under Rule 30 or 31 , or a 
corporation or other entity fails to make a designation 
under Rule 30(b)(6) or 31(a), or a party fails to answer an 
interrogatory submitted under Rule 33, or if a party, in 
response to a request for inspection submitted under Rule 
34, fails to respond that inspection will be permitted as 
requested or fails to permit inspection as requested, the 
discovering party may move for an order compelling an 
answer, or a designation, or an order compelling inspec-
tion in accordance with the request. When taking a 
deposition on oral examination, the proponent of the 
question may complete or adjourn the examination before 
he applies for an order. 
If the court denies the motion in whole or in part , it may 
make such protective order as it would have been empow-
ered to make on a motion made pursuant to Rule 26(c). 
(3) Evasive or incomplete answer. For purposes of 
this subdivision an evasive or incomplete answer is to be 
treated as a failure to answer. 
(4) Award of expenses of motion. If the motion is 
granted, the court shall, after opportunity for hearing, 
require the party or deponent whose conduct necessitated 
the motion or the party or attorney advising such conduct 
or both of them to pay to the moving party the reasonable 
expenses incurred in obtaining the order, including attor-
ney fees, unless the court finds that the opposition to the 
motion was substantially justified or tha t other circum-
stances make an award of expenses unjust. 
If the motion is denied, the court shall, after opportu-
nity for hearing, require the moving party or the attorney 
advising the motion or both of them to pay to the party or 
deponent who opposed the motion the reasonable ex-
penses incurred in opposing the motion, including attor-
ney fees, unless t h e court finds that the making of the 
motion was substantially justified or tha t other circum-
stances make an award of expenses unjust. 
If the motion is granted in part and denied in part, the 
court may apportion the reasonable expenses incurred in 
relation to the motion among the parties and persons in a 
just manner, 
(b) F a i l u r e to c o m p l y wi th order . 
(1) S a n c t i o n s by cou r t in d i s t r i c t w h e r e deposi -
t ion is t a k e n . If a deponent fails to be sworn or to answer 
a question after being directed to do so by the court in the 
district in which the deposition is being taken, the failure 
may be considered a contempt of that court. 
(2) S a n c t i o n s by cou r t in w h i c h a c t i o n is p e n d i n g . 
If a party or an officer, director, or managing agent of a 
party or a person designated under Rule 30(b)(6) or 31(a) 
to testify on behalf of a party fails to obey an order to 
provide or permit discovery, including an order made 
under Subdivision (a) of this rule or Rule 35, or if a party 
fails to obey an order entered under Rule 26(f), ihe court 
in which the action is pending may make such orders in 
regard to the failure as are just, and among others the 
following: 
(A) an order that the matters regarding which the 
order was made or any other designated facts shall be 
taken to be established for the purposes of the action 
in accordance with the claim of the party obtaining 
the order; 
(B) an order refusing to allow the disobedient 
party to support or oppose designated claims or 
defenses, or prohibiting him from introducing desig-
nated matters in evidence; 
(C) an order striking out pleadings or parts 
thereof, staying further proceedings until the order is 
obeyed, dismissing the action or proceeding or anv 
part thereof, or rendering a judgment by default 
against the disobedient party; 
(D) in lieu of any of the foregoing orders or in 
addition thereto, an order treating as a contempt of 
court the failure to obey any orders except an order to 
submit to a physical or mental examination; 
(E) where a party has failed to comply with an 
order under Rule 35(a) requiring him to produce 
another for examination, such orders as are listed in 
Paragraphs (A), (B), and (C) of this subdivision, 
unless the party failing to comply shows that he is 
unable to produce such person for examination. 
In lieu of any of the foregoing orders or in addition 
thereto, the court shall require the party failing to obey 
the order or the attorney advising him or both to pay the 
reasonable expenses, including attorney fees, caused by 
the failure, unless the court finds that the failure was 
substantially justified or that other circumstances make 
an award of expenses unjust. 
(c) E x p e n s e s on fa i lure to admi t , if a party fails to admit 
the genuineness of any document or the truth of any matter as 
requested under Rule 36, and if the party requesting the 
admissions thereafter proves the genuineness of the document 
or the t ru th of the matter, he may apply to the court for an 
order requiring the other party to pay him the reasonable 
expenses incurred in making that proof, including reasonable 
attorney's fees. The court shall make the order unless it finds 
that (1) the request was held objectionable pursuan t to Rule 
36(a), or (2) the admission sought was of no substantial 
importance, or (3) the party failing to admit had reasonable 
ground to believe that he might prevail on the matter, or (4) 
there was other good reason for the failure to admit . 
(d) F a i l u r e of p a r t y to a t t e n d a t o w n d e p o s i t i o n o r 
serve a n s w e r s t o i n t e r r o g a t o r i e s or r e s p o n d to r e q u e s t 
for i n spec t ion . If a party or an officer, director, or managing 
agent of a party or a person designated under Rule 30(bX6) or 
31(a) to testify on behalf of a party fails (1) to appear before the 
officer who is to take his deposition, after being served with a 
proper notice, or (2) to serve answers or objections to inter-
rogatories submitted under Rule 33, after proper service of the 
interrogatories, or (3) to serve a written response to a request 
for inspection submitted under Rule 34, after proper service of 
the request, the court in which the action is pending on motion 
may make such orders in regard to the failure as are just, and 
among others it may take any action authorized under Para-
graphs (A), (B), and (C) of Subdivision (bX2) of this rule. In lieu 
of any order or in addition thereto, the court shall require the 
party failing to act or the attorney advising him or both to pay 
the reasonable expenses, including attorney's fees, caused by 
the failure, unless the court finds that the failure was sub-
stantially justified or that other circumstances make an award 
of expenses unjust. 
The failure to act described in this subdivision may not be 
excused on the ground that the discovery sought is objection-
able unless the party failing to act has applied for a protective 
order as provided by Rule 26(c). 
(e) F a i l u r e to p a r t i c i p a t e in t h e f r a m i n g of a discov-
ery p lan . If a party or his attorney fails to participate in good 
faith in the framing of a discovery plan by agreement as is 
required by Rule 26(f), the court may, after opportunity for 
hearing, require such party or his attorney to pay to any other 
p;:rty the reasonable expenses, including attorney fees. rMns«-d 
by the failure. 
Amended effective Jan. 1, 1987.) 
Rule 60. Relief from judgment or order. 
(b) Mistakes; inadvertence; excusable neglect; newly 
discovered evidence; fraud, etc. On motion and upon such 
terms as are just, the court may in the furtherance of justice 
relieve a party or his legal representative from a final judg-
ment, order, or proceeding for the following reasons: (1) 
mistake, inadvertence, surprise, or excusable neglect; (2) 
newly discovered evidence which by due diligence could not 
have been discovered in time to move for a new trial under 
Rule 59(b); (3) fraud (whether heretofore denominated intrin-
sic or extrinsic), misrepresentation or other misconduct of an 
adverse party; (4) when, for any cause, the summons in an 
action has not been personally served upon the defendant as 
required by Rule 4(e) and the defendant has failed to appear in 
said action; (5) the judgment is void, (6) the judgment has been 
satisfied, released, or discharged, or a prior judgment upon 
which it is based has been reversed or otherwise vacated, or it 
is no longer equitable that the judgment should have prospec-
tive application, or (7) any other reason justifying relief from 
the operation of the judgment The motion shall be made 
within a reasonable time and for reasons (1), (2), (3), or (4), not 
more than 3 months after the judgment, order, or proceeding 
was entered or taken A motion under this Subdivision (b) does 
not affect the finality of a judgment or suspend its operation 
This rule does not limit the power of a court to entertain an 
independent action to relieve a party from a judgment, order 
or proceeding or to set aside a judgment for fraud upon the 
court. The procedure for obtaining any relief from a judgment 
shall be by motion as prescribed in these rules or by an 
mdependent action 
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WILLARD R. BISHOP, P. C. 
Willard R. Bishop - #0344 
Attorney for Defendant 
P. O. Box 279 
Cedar City, UT 84721-0279 
Telephone: (801) 586-9483 
IN THE FIFTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF WASHINGTON COUNTY 
STATE OF UTAH 
PAULA JEAN WRIGHT, and the 
STATE OF UTAH, by and through 
Utah State Department of Social 
Services, 
Plaintiffs, 
vs. 
JOHNNY FRANK WRIGHT, 
Defendant. 
ORDER STRIKING "ANSWER TO 
PETITION TO MODIFY DECREE 
OF DIVORCE", AND STRIKING 
"COUNTER-PETITION", AND 
GRANTING JUDGMENT IN FAVOR 
OF DEFENDANT 
Case No. 904500236DA 
Honorable James L Shumate 
This matter having been presented to the Court pursuant to Defendant's "Motion 
to Strike 'Answer to Petition to Modify Decree of Divorce', 'Counter-Petition', and for 
Judgment", supported by the "Affidavit of Johnny Frank Wright" and by Defendant's 
"Memorandum in Support of Motion to Strike 'Answer to Petition to Modify Decree of 
Divorce', 'Counter-Petition', and for Judgment", and the Court having reviewed the same, 
and having noted that no opposition to said motion was filed by Plaintiff Paula Jean 
Wright, and it clearly appearing from the Court's review of the files and records of this 
case that Plaintiff Paula Jean Wright has failed to respond to discovery propounded by 
'0 ^ 
Defendant, and that such failure on the part of Plaintiff Paula Jean Wright has impeded 
and frustrated the judicial process, in that it has hindered trial of this matter upon its 
merits, and has made it impossible to determine the factual basis for any allegations 
made by Plaintiff in her "Answer to Petition to Modify Decree of Divorce" and in her 
"Counter-Petition", and good cause appearing, 
NOW, THEREFORE, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED, ADJUDGED, AND DECREED as 
follows: 
1. That Plaintiff's "Answer to Petition to Modify Decree of Divorce" in this 
matter should be and it hereby is, stricken from the files and records of this case. 
2. That Plaintiff's "Counter-Petition" should be and it hereby is, stricken from 
the files and records of this case. 
3. That the default of Plaintiff Paula Jean Wright, with respect to Defendant's 
"Petition to Modify Decree of Divorce" should be and it hereby is, entered. 
4. That default judgment should be and it hereby is, entered in favor of 
Defendant Johnny Frank Wright and against Plaintiff Paula Jean Wright, with respect to 
Defendant's "Petition to Modify Decree of Divorce". 
5. That Defendant Johnny Frank Wright should be and he hereby is, awarded 
the care, custody, and control of the parties' minor child, Brandi Jean Wright, born 
November 2, 1989, subject to visitation rights in Paula Jean Wright. 
2 ") ^ "-> 
6. That the visitation rights of Plaintiff Paula Jean Wright should be and hereby 
are, decreed to include those set forth in the provisions of UCA 30-3-35 (1953, as 
amended), provided, however, that such rights of visitation should be and hereby are, 
made subject to the provision and requirement that Plaintiff Paula Jean Wright not 
remove Brandi Jean Wright from Iron County, Utah, without first obtaining written 
permission of Defendant Johnny Frank Wright, or without first obtaining written orders 
from this Court approving such removal for visitation. 
7. That any obligation of Defendant Johnny Frank Wright to pay child support 
to Plaintiff Paula Jean Wright should be and it hereby is, terminated. 
8. That Defendant Johnny Frank Wright should be and he hereby is, awarded 
child support, and that Plaintiff Paula Jean Wright should be and she hereby is, required 
to pay child support, in accordance with the applicable guidelines now in effect, said 
award of child support to be determined in accordance with applicable law, with the 
assistance of the State of Utah, Department of Social Service, Office of Recovery 
Services. 
9. That Defendant Johnny Frank Wright should be and hereby is, awarded his 
costs of court and attorney fees incurred in connection with these proceedings, such 
award to be evidenced by a subsequent "Judgment for Attorney Fees" to be granted to 
3 -v> ^ l 
Johnny Frank Wright, upon Defendant Johnny Frank Wright furnishing an affidavit of his 
costs and attorney fees incurred in connection with these proceedings, to this Court. 
DATED this day of April, 1996. 
BY THE COURT: 
:"&& 
v<fAMES L SHUMATE 
e?3, 
FILED 
F I F ' H DISTRICT COURT 
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WILLARD R. BISHOP, P. C. 
Willard R. Bishop - #0344 
Attorney for Defendant 
P. O. Box 279 
Cedar City, UT 84721-0279 
Telephone: (801)586-9483 
IN THE FIFTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF WASHINGTON COUNTY 
STATE OF UTAH 
PAULA JEAN WRIGHT, and the 
STATE OF UTAH, by and through 
Utah State Department of Social 
Services, ) O R D E R 
Plaintiffs, ) 
vs. ) 
) Case No. 904500236DA 
JOHNNY FRANK WRIGHT, ) Honorable James L Shumate 
Defendant. ) 
The above-entitled matter came on regularly before the Honorable James L. 
Shumate, District Judge, pursuant to the Court's "Order for Expedited Hearing", in 
connection with Plaintiff Paula Jean Wright's "Motion for Relief from Order and Judgment, 
Motion for Stay, and Request for Expedited Hearing and Decision". Plaintiff Paula Jean 
Wright, now "Tisdell", appeared personally and was represented by her attorney of 
record, Mr. Floyd W. Holm. Defendant State of Utah, by and through the Utah State 
Department of Social Services, appeared in the person of its attorney, Mr. Paul F. Graf, 
Esq., Assistant Attorney General Defendant Johnny Frank Wright appeared personally, 
3i7 
WAShiNGTON COUNTY 
BY Jjtf/ 
and was represented by his attorney of record, Mr. Willard R. Bishop. The Court 
reviewed the files and records of the case. Oral argument was had. the Court being 
fully advised in the premises, and good cause appearing, 
NOW, THEREFORE, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED, ADJUDGED, AND DECREED that 
Plaintiff's "Motion for Relief from Order and Judgment", and Plaintiff's "Motion for Stay" 
should be and they hereby are, overruled and denied. 
DATED this 5~ day oHdsy?1996. 
BY THE COURT: 
. *' •:< ~ 
JAMES Li SHUMATE, District Judge 
APPROVED AS TO FORM 
65 fife-
•xy*\-3 
FLOYOW. HOLM 
Attorney for Plaintiff PAULA JEAN TISDELL 
(fqrmerly^WRIGHT) /J h 
.LARDTl BISHOP 
Attorney for Defendant JOHNNY FRANK WRIGHT 
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FLOYD W HOLM (1522) 
965 South Main, Suite 3 
P.O. Box 765 
Cedar City, UT 84720 
Telephone: (801)586-6532 
IN THE FIFTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF WASHINGTON COUNTY 
STATE OF UTAH 
PAULA JEAN WRIGHT, and the ] 
STATE OF UTAH, by and through ; 
Utah State Department of Social ] 
Services, ] 
Plaintiff ] 
vs. ] 
JOHNNY FRANK WRIGHT, ) 
Defendant 
> AFFIDAVrr OF PAULA J. TISDALE 
i Civil No. 904500236 
I Judge James L. Shumate 
STATE OF UTAH ) 
ss. 
COUNTY OF UlAtj ) 
I, Paula J. Tisdale being first duly sworn upon oath, depose and say as follows: 
1. I am the Plaintiff in the above-entitled action and have personal knowledge 
regarding the facts stated herein. 
2. In or about August, 1995 I was served with the pending Petition to Modify Decree 
1 
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of Divorce. 
3. I immediately obtained counsel to represent me, Mr. Michael W. Pari^ and filed an 
Answer to the Petition and a Counter Petition on or about September 15,1995. 
4. Sometime after October 19,1995, my counsel mailed to me, Defendant's First Set 
of Discovery Request to PlaintiflF, Paula Jean Wright Also, I received a copy of PlaintifPs First 
Set of Interrogatories and Request for Production of Documents that were served by counsel on 
Defendant on or about October 30,1995. After receiving copies of those documents I did not 
hear anything further from my counsel and, based on information I obtained from others that 
Defendant was having difficulty in his current marriage, I believed that the matter had been 
dropped. 
5. In late January, 1996,1 received a Notice of Withdrawal of Counsel from Mr. 
Park and shortly thereafter received a Notice to Appoint Counsel or to Represent Self 
6. Again, nothing occurred in the case until early April, 1996 when I received 
Defendant's Motion to Strike "Answer to Petition to Modify Decree of Divorce", and for 
Judgment. 
7. Immediately upon receipt of the aforesaid Motion, I again contacted Mr. Park to 
see if I could again obtain his assistance in the case. When I finally spoke to Mr. Park, he 
advised me that he would require a retainer that I was unable to pay in order to re-enter his 
appearance in the case and, suggested that 1 contact Utah Legal Services Corporation, 
2 
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8. I contacted Legal Services Corporation in Salt Lake City and after contacting 
them was advised that since the case was pending in Washington County I should contact the 
Cedar City Office of Legal Services, 
9. 1 finally contacted the Cedar City office of Legal Services in mid April and on or 
about April 24,1996 received a letter, dated April 18,1996 fix>m Utah I^al Services, advising 
me that, although I was financially eligible for Legal Services, it could not handle my case. I 
then immediately contacted Mr. Floyd W Holm who has now agreed to represent me. 
10. By the time Mr. Holm was able to review the case, this Court had already granted 
the aforesaid motion and entered Judgment against me. 
11. The subject minor child is presently 6V% years of age and is enrolled in public 
school, Kindergarten. She last had visitation with her father approximately one (1) year ago. I 
believe it would be very traumatic if my daughter were removed from school and placed in the 
custody of Defendant while my Motion to for Relief from Order and Judgment is pending. 
DATED this 2- day of May, 1996, 
PAULAJ.HSBAfcfr T \ S D g f L L 
SUBSCRIBED and SWORN to before me thisC^ day of May, 1996. 
_A_ 
'-. V_- ^ i , />*C. • •:i**£c-*Z&B$rf£4 
NOTARY PUBLIC^, 
Residing at: 1\JWT 
X#'%, CHfasiiNti. SALMON J
 M y Commission Expires: ^\fOV\ % , ^ ^ 
/jfapgs&\ Notary PuDtic W J y Cll/Wi, Uj Irapl State of Utah : o m m ->:plro.' !an8,?QQ0 
x
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